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THIS CALL MAY BE MONITORED: IS NSA
WIRETAPPING LEGAL?
March 29, 2006
There is no clear cut answer to the legal controversy over the
National Security Agency (NSA) program, authorized by President
George W. Bush, of intercepting electronic communications into and out
of the United States by or to persons linked to al Qaeda or related
organizations. Factually, the general public knows relatively little of the
details of the program. Even on the basis of current information about
the problem, this program raises legal issues of some difficulty and
complexity. Professor Robert J. Delahunty of The University of St.
Thomas Law School identified and attempted to answer six major legal
issues concerning whether NSA's wiretapping program violated the law
at an event hosted by the National Security Forum.
Professor Delahunty first posed the following question: Does the
President have inherent constitutional authority, as Commander-in-Chief
(CNC) during a time of congressionally authorized war, to conduct an
intelligence gathering operation of this kind? He argued that the
President does have inherent constitutional authority to use electronic
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence during a time of war. First,
this authority is implicit in the CNC power: gathering intelligence
information from or about an enemy is a recognized, traditional, and
necessary means of waging war successfully. Second, the appellate
courts have regularly acknowledged that the President has such authority.
One FISA court review, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (2002),
stated "all the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held that the
President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to
obtain foreign intelligence information." Third, the historical practice
and constitutional understanding of the executive branch supports such a
conclusion. When Congress investigated the matter they found that
every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt had both asserted the
authority to order warrantless surveillance and had utilized that authority.
Next, Professor Delahunty addressed whether the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2002-the statute
that codified Congress' first legislative response to the events of 9/11-
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furnished legal authority, over and above any inherent constitutional
power the President may have, to conduct this program? The AUMF
was enacted within a week of the 9/11 attacks. Section 2 of the AUMF,
50 U.S.C. § 1541(2)(a), reads:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Professor Delahunty argued that the AUMF lends some statutory
support to the President's authority to order the NSA program. In Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), five Justices concluded that the
AUMF authorized the President to detain enemy combatants, including
U.S. citizens notwithstanding a statute that prohibits detention of citizens
"except pursuant to an Act of Congress." The theory of Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion was that the detention of enemy
combatants was "fundamental and accepted as an incident to war."
Delahunty found the Justice Department's argument persuasive that if
the AUMF authorizes the detention of captured enemy combatants, it
must also authorize the use of electronic surveillance to intercept foreign
intelligence, because the latter activity, no less than the former, is a
fundamental and accepted incident of waging war. Also, intelligence
gathering (what some may characterize as "spying") is clearly a
recognized and traditional method of waging war under the Hague
Convention.
He then considered whether the program violates the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA sets out a highly reticulated
procedural scheme for conducting electronic surveillance to collect
foreign intelligence and states, at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), that it "shall be
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may
be conducted." The NSA program does not follow those statutory
procedures and is therefore in violation of FISA according to Delahunty.
More specifically with respects to the President's authority in time of
war, FISA says the President may conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance for 15 days, but no longer.
Professor Delahunty then asked: If the program does violate FISA,
does the AUMF either impliedly repeal the relevant parts of FISA or
provide implicit statutory authorization within the terms of FISA? A
distinguished group of legal scholars and former government officials
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argued in a January 9, 2006, letter to Congress that "the AUMF cannot
reasonably be construed to implicitly authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance in the United States during wartime, where Congress has
expressly and specifically addressed that precise question in FISA and
limited any such warrantless surveillance to the first fifteen days of war."
(Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2006)). The Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that
because FISA allows for its own suspension for fifteen days during a
declared war, it should be read to remain unsuspended in an authorized,
but undeclared war. In other words, DOJ argued that FISA's reference to
"declared" wars may have evinced Congress's intent to avoid making a
provision for the more common case of an authorized, but undeclared
war. Professor Delahunty considered this analysis unconvincing. He
stated, "Congress seems to me to have intended a future declaration of
war to have a limited suspensive effect on the FISA, but a future
authorization of war to have, as such, no effect on FISA's normal
workings."
FISA also prohibits, at 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1), any person from
intentionally engaging in electronic surveillance under color of law
"except as authorized by statute," a provision which the DOJ argued
makes it possible for any subsequent authorizing statute-not merely one
that amended or repealed FISA itself-to authorize surveillance outside
FISA's standard procedural requirements. This argument also proved
unconvincing for Delahunty. While it is plausible to say that the AUMF
generally authorizes the President to use recognized and traditional
methods of waging war against al Qaeda, Delahunty finds it a far less
persuasive claim that it authorizes the unconstrained use of methods
closely and carefully regulated by other Acts of Congress.
He then considered: If the program does not violate FISA, is the
FISA unconstitutional as applied to the NSA program, either because it
usurps a constitutional power that is exclusive to the President, or
because it unduly impairs the President in the exercise of his CNC
function? In considering this issue, Professor Delahunty considered the
most important question to be: Can Congress require the President, even
when faced in post-9/11 conditions with the urgent need to intercept an
international electronic communication to or from someone reasonably
suspected to be an al Qaeda operative, to obtain a judicial warrant, even
when that communication may be conveying information relevant to a
terrorist strike against the U.S., and even if the information will not be
captured if the warrant is sought? For those that say "no", Delahunty
pointed out two possible rationales. The first is that the power in
2007] 1673
3
et al.: This Call May Be Monitored: Is NSA Wiretapping Legal?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
question is exclusively presidential, and hence not subject to regulation
by Congress. The second basis is that even if Congress holds concurrent
authority over surveillance of this kind with the President, congressional
regulation (as applied in particular instances) may be an unconstitutional
impairment of the President's own constitutional authority as CNC.
Conversely, Congress unquestionably has the enumerated power to make
rules for the government and regulation of the military, including the
NSA. Therefore, Delahunty pointed out, one could argue that Congress
has the power to preclude the military from making use of particular
methods of conducting a war.
Delahunty found the more formidable claim to be that the FISA, if
construed to forbid the NSA program, would be unconstitutional in that
application because it would unduly impair the President's ability to
discharge his constitutional responsibilities. He suggested that the
underlying constitutional principle at work is that Congress may
altogether ban the particular means or methods of warfare, and it may
also restrict their use during a time of war; but it may not condition their
wartime use on nothing more than the passage of time because that
would impose an inflexible grid, unrelated to the exigencies of battle, on
the discretionary tactical choices of the President as CNC.
Finally, Professor Delahunty asked: If the FISA is unconstitutional
as applied to the NSA program, is the program nonetheless itself
unconstitutional because it violates the Fourth Amendment? Delahunty
argued that the NSA program may involve circumstances where "special
needs beyond the need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable," as discussed in Griffith v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 465
U.S. 325, 351 (1985)). The interception of electronic communications of
a wartime enemy that knows that the NSA is searching for it, and that
constantly takes sudden and unforeseeable means to conceal itself, might
well be considered a circumstance in which seeking a warrant is
impracticable. Delahunty concluded, "we simply do not know enough at
this point to evaluate either the practicability of alternatives to the NSA
program or the degree to which it has intruded upon the personal privacy
of ordinary citizens. Until we do, it would be rash to say that the
program violates the 4th Amendment."
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